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The Impact of Possible-Offer Announcements on the Wealth Effect of 
Target Firms 
 
The stock market materially and positively responds to released information on 
possible offers, likely because such announcements signal the high probability 
that formal bids will be offered. If potential takeover discussions are revealed 
earlier, then target shareholders will gain significantly lower abnormal returns 
around the time of when formal offers are announced. Financial bidders are less 
likely to approach targets with earlier possible offers; however, if they do offer 
possible takeovers, they need to pay incrementally higher bid premiums in their 
formal offers. The reform inherent in the UK Takeover Code of 2011 weakens a 
bidder’s willingness to offer possible takeovers. The pre-reform effects of 
possible offers on the wealth effect of targets differ from those seen after the 
reform.   
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions; Possible offer; Natural experiment; 
Financial bidder; Wealth effect 





Before formal deal announcements, possible takeover discussions may be 
acknowledged by bidders, targets, or both. The literature that focuses on information 
leakage about, or rumors of, takeovers largely overlooks informal takeover 
announcements, or combines rumors with informal takeover announcements (Aktas, de 
Bodt and Roll 2010; Ahern and Sosyura 2014). Mulherin and Simsir (2015) were the 
first researchers to suggest that in the absence of considerations of merger-related events 
(e.g., rumors, financing information, and informal takeover announcements), estimates 
of target firms’ abnormal returns are biased. However, it is difficult to interpret the 
general impact of combined merger-related events, as they contain complicated 
information that may have varied effects on the market’s anticipation of a formal bid 
and the target stock price. A possible offer is publicly accessible information explicating 
the possible takeover discussion between bidders and targets. Unlike rumors on 
takeovers, the release of a possible offer by bidders, targets or both may systematically 
improve the market’s anticipation of the likelihood of a formal takeover offer 
announcement, so that the stock market responds positively to this announcement. 
Research on the role of possible offers in the context of US or UK markets has been 
scarce. To provide a clearer interpretation of the role of possible offers, the current 
study isolates the effect of possible offers from other merger-related events and 
investigates how possible-offer announcements influence the wealth effects on target 
firm shareholders during the negotiation period. 
A newly added clause in the updated UK Takeover Code of September 2011—
namely, the 28-day ‘put-up or shut-up’ (PUSU) period—specifically restricts the 
behavior of bidders who approach target firms to make initial possible offers. It requires 
that this type of bidder express its formal bidding intention within 28 days of a possible-
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offer announcement. If a bidder eventually states no intention of bidding within those 
28 days, then that bidder must not approach the same target again in the subsequent six 
months (Takeover Panel 2011).1 This reform highlights the role of a possible offer in 
deal negotiations. As such, we are able to examine the effects of possible offers on the 
wealth gains of targets, based on a natural-experiment environment created by virtue of 
the 2011 reform.  
We start our investigation into the role of possible-offer announcements by 
examining the likelihood that these announcements will occur. We identify financial 
bidders and the 28-day PUSU reform as the important determinants of possible-offer 
announcements. Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) observe that, compared to strategic 
bidders, financial bidders (mainly private equity [PE] firms) with expertise in firm 
valuation and deal negotiation are less likely to offer both informal and formal bids. 
Fund information reports disseminated by PE firms are voluntary (Kaplan and Schoar 
2005); given this fact, PE firms are able to approach targets more secretively and avoid 
the potential (and intensive) competition that would have occurred had potential 
takeover discussions been revealed earlier. After the 28-day PUSU period, bidders may 
be more cautious in choosing to disclose potential takeover discussions, because should 
the bidding not be made firm within 28 days, they then bear the risk of needing to step 
aside for six months. Using manually collected data, we find that financial bidders are 
significantly less likely to announce possible offers; additionally, in the post-reform 
period, the likelihood of a possible-offer announcement is even significantly lower.  
We then investigate separately how the stock market responds to possible-offer 
announcements and to formal offers. Among the sample of 990 takeovers, we observe 
409 deals for which there were earlier possible offers. Comparing the three-day offer-
announcement returns around possible-offer announcements (22.69 percentage points) 
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and formal-offer announcements (15.65 percentage points), we find that, on average, the 
market response to a possible-offer announcement is strikingly more positive than that 
to a formal-offer announcement. This could be due to a higher level of anticipation for 
subsequent formal bids. By matching the dates of formal-offer announcements for deals 
with possible offers and those without possible offers,2 we find that target shareholders 
generate significantly more abnormal returns around the date on which possible offers 
are announced. 
Financial bidders tend to acquire undervalued firms that have growth potential, 
while strategic bidders pay more attention to post-takeover synergies (Gorbenko and 
Malenko 2014). On account of this difference, the stock market may respond 
distinctively towards announcements of possible and formal offers; therefore, we also 
explore the potential difference in the wealth gains of target shareholders, between deals 
with financial and strategic bidders. After interacting the indicator of possible offers 
with the indicator of financial bidders, the regression results show that the shareholders 
of the target firm gain even higher returns around the time of a possible-offer 
announcement if the bidder is a financial firm. We assert that financial bidders 
associated with a lower likelihood of revealing possible-offer discussions impose a 
stronger shock to the stock market when they disclose possible offers in reality.  
When examining the wealth gains around the dates of formal announcements, 
interestingly, we observe significantly less wealth gains during this event window in 
cases where a possible offer had already been released. The earlier results suggest that 
stock returns surge around the time of possible-offer announcements. By combining 
these two findings, we attribute the relatively low returns around the formal 
announcement dates to the fact that formal offers that follow revelations of potential 
takeover discussions impose weaker shocks on the stock market around the time that a 
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formal bid is offered. Additionally, we note that financial bidders that approach target 
firms with initial possible offers do not have an incremental impact on shareholders’ 
wealth gains associated with formal offers. 
Earlier price run-ups prior to the offer of a formal bid may lead to higher offer 
premiums (Schwert 1996; 2000). Although earlier and more furious price increases 
around the dates of possible-offer announcements do not happen in the immediate run-
up to a formal-offer announcement, they may also contribute positively to the offer 
premiums that the targets can receive. Therefore, we investigate whether the 
announcement of a possible offer benefits the target shareholders by increasing the bid 
price so as to enhance bid premiums. Our results show that the offer of possible 
takeovers significantly and positively contributes to improvements in offer premiums, 
irrespective of first and final-bid premiums. Given their relatively lower level of 
concern about synergies relative to strategic bidders, financial bidders tend to offer 
lower prices during target acquisition (Gorbenko and Malenko 2014). Interestingly, the 
results indicate that target firms receive even higher bid premiums if they are 
approached by a financial bidder with a possible offer prior to when the formal offer is 
made. Therefore, we further develop the interpretation that financial bidders are 
reluctant to disclose takeover discussions before a takeover announcement is made firm. 
Nevertheless, if possible offers are disclosed for deals with financial bidders, the stock 
market responds to the announcement more positively—likely because of stronger 
market shock and higher anticipated deal premiums. 
In addition, empirical results show that target shareholder returns through either 
possible-offer or formal-offer announcements make no prominent difference in the pre-
reform period; this remains true in the post-reform period. Estimation results with 
respect to the Kaplan–Meier hazard function suggest that the 28-day PUSU period 
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effectively limits the length of the pre-public negotiation period during which the 
potential target is subject to the risk of being taken over. However, when splitting the 
full sample into two groups—which is to say, those before and after 2011, the year of 
the reform—the results demonstrate a structure break regarding the effect of possible-
offer announcements on the wealth effects of targets.  
This study sheds light on the effect of possible offers announced prior to formal 
bids; this effect is seldom explored in the literature. We fill this literature gap by 
carefully examining the effects of possible offers on the wealth gains of target 
shareholders around possible-offer and formal-offer announcements. We also affirm 
that the release of a possible offer causes higher stock returns in the period leading up to 
the formal-offer announcement date, and this eventually leads to higher formal offer 
premiums. The current study is also the first empirical study to examine a financial 
bidder’s likelihood of releasing official information with regard to possible takeover 
discussions. In addition, no sufficient research has yet empirically examined how the 
reform inherent in the Takeover Code of 2011 drives the effect of possible-offer 
announcements. The current study takes this regulatory change into account. Although 
the current study focuses on the UK takeovers market, it is also expected to contribute 
to the literature on the US context, where there is limited exogenous variation in 
antitakeover laws. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
negotiation process for UK takeovers and the particulars of the 28-day PUSU clause. A 
literature review and hypotheses are provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents sample 
and descriptive statistics, and the main empirical results are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 contains further analysis of the effect of the Takeover Code’s regulatory 
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change and aggregate economic conditions. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding 
remarks. 
2. The takeover negotiation process and 28-day PUSU period 
2.1.  The negotiation process  
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009) develop a takeover process model to investigate 
toehold power in the negotiation procedure. They clarify two stages in the negotiation 
process for US takeovers—namely, private negotiation, followed by a public 
competitive procedure should that private negotiation fail. Boone and Mulherin (2007), 
in shedding light on the selling process (from the perspective of target firms), speak of 
the private takeover process that takes place prior to the public contest. In the private 
negotiation stage, the contacted bidders receive non-public information and promise not 
to announce an unsolicited deal (Hansen 2001). Studies in more recent years have 
gradually underscored the prevalence of informal bidding discussions prior to formal-
offer announcements. For example, Aktas et al. (2010) find that latent competition 
during the entire deal negotiation including both private and public negotiation periods 
stimulates an increase in offer premiums. The entire deal negotiation starts from the date 
of the first merger discussion between the two parties (Ahern and Sosyura 2014). With 
regard to differences in the bidding strategies of strategic and financial bidders, 
Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) were the first to identify informal bids where potential 
offerors disclose their bid intentions. (In the current study, the term ‘informal bid’ refers 
to a possible offer.) In their sample, approximately one-third of bidders make informal 
bids, and strategic bidders tend to announce both informal and formal bids. Nonetheless, 
the true extent of causality between possible-offer announcements and the wealth gains 
of shareholders remains widely unexplored. 
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Figure 1 shows the negotiation process for UK takeovers. We split the 
negotiation process into three stages. The period from the initiation of confidential deal 
communications to the possible-offer announcement date is defined as the ‘private 
negotiation stage.’ During this period, rumors may emerge. The ‘pre-public negotiation 
stage’ occurs in the interval between the possible-offer announcement date and the 
formal-offer announcement date. Releasing a possible-offer announcement attracts the 
public awareness of the deal transaction. Once a formal offer is announced, the 
negotiation enters the ‘public negotiation stage.’ It is possible that no possible offer is 
published during the negotiation process; in this scenario, private negotiation is defined 
as taking place between the start of confidential negotiation communications and the 
date before the formal-offer announcement. Appendix B offers anecdotal evidence in 
terms of how a takeover document states the announcement of possible offers. 
2.2. 28-day PUSU term 
Pre-emptive anti-takeover provisions are inhibited for UK takeovers, which in line with 
one of the principles affiliated to the UK takeover regime that target companies are not 
expected to frustrate a bid (Armour, Deakin, and Konzelmann, 2003). This sacrifices 
much of the bargaining power of the target side in a deal negotiation process, which is 
reflected by lower offer price and weaker benefits for target firms’ managers and 
shareholders. The decree of the updated UK Takeover Code in September 2011 makes 
some material alterations to restrict the use of deal-protection devices. These changes 
aim to rebalance the bargaining power between targets and bidders by controlling the 
potential threats related to ‘virtual bids’ (Payne, 2011). The updated Takeover Code 
incorporates four new features: general inhibition of the use of target termination fees; 
the request to identify potential bidders at the beginning of the offer period; automatic 
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28-day PUSU deadlines; and reinforced information disclosure in offer documents 
(Clifford Chance, 2011).  
The 28-day PUSU clause requests bidders to clarify their current bid intention 
within 28 days since declaring possible offers. This aims at limiting the length of the 
pre-public negotiation period in which the potential target is subject to the risk of being 
taken over. If offerors acknowledge no bid intention within these 28 days, they need to 
stand away from the same target for the following six months. In this way, the price 
volatility around possible and formal offers of targets and bidders caused by 
information about possible offers may change accordingly. The 28-day PUSU also 
tends to improve the bargaining power of targets, as target firms can reject a request to 
extend the PUSU deadline or stop the offer talk if they are unsatisfied with the terms in 
a deal discussion. 
3. Literature review and hypotheses 
3.1. The determinants of announcing possible offers 
A possible-offer announcement is an official statement from bidders and/or targets to 
acknowledge the discussion of a potential merger; this statement is typically made in 
response to recent rumors or stock price volatility. It is unlike a rumor or other type of 
information leakage. Rumors are normally considered a detrimental factor with respect 
to deal completion, deal valuation (Alperovych, Cumming, and Groh 2016), shareholder 
benefits (e.g., Ahern and Sosyra 2015; Leung and Ton 2015), and market efficiency 
(e.g., Han and Yang 2013). However, possible-offer announcements constitute public 
information disclosed by reliable sources (i.e., bidders and/or targets) that is expected to 




Financial bidders, which are mainly PE firms, are more concerned about the growth 
opportunities of potential targets (Kester and Luehrman 1995) and tend to be relatively 
smaller firms (Renneboog, Simons, and Wright 2007). PE firms are more autonomous 
in their ability to choose the extent to which they release fund information. Hence, they 
are more likely to hold private negotiation information, to avoid attracting raiders. 
Additionally, financial bidders’ professional expertise in firm valuation and deal 
negotiation (e.g., Gorbenko and Malenko 2014) may make them skillful in ‘skipping’ 
the process of announcing possible offers. In addition, only a few personnel from 
financial bidders are involved in pre-public negotiations (Alperovych et al. 2016), and 
so there is less of a likelihood that bid-preparation information will be leaked from 
financial bidders.  
The reform of the UK Takeover Code in 2011 repeals certain deal-protection 
devices and tends to improve the target-side bargaining position for UK takeovers 
(Code Committee 2012). Martynova and Renneboog (2008) suggest that takeover 
waves are frequently driven by regulatory changes; therefore, the regulatory change 
inherent in the UK Takeover Code may influence the likelihood of being acquired and 
the ways of being approached. The 28-day PUSU clause limits the duration between 
possible-offer and formal-offer announcements, to control threats related to ‘virtual 
bids’ that are encountered by targets (Payne 2011). Hence, we put forward Hypotheses 
1a and 1b, as follows. 
Hypothesis 1a: Target firms are less likely to be approached through initial 
possible offers by financial bidders. 




3.2. The effect of announcing possible offers 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that rumors of an impending bid in news coverage lead 
to prominent stock price run-ups in the period immediately leading up to the formal-
offer announcement date. Rumors of takeovers through media can impede the 
negotiation progress. In such circumstances, both sides of the takeover transaction may 
reach an agreement to announce informal offers, in order to suppress any market 
volatility imposed by rumors. Alternatively, bidders may deliberately reveal discussions 
with current targets vis-à-vis a potential takeover announcement, if they feel that the 
target is reluctant to further negotiate the takeover transactions: bidders will put out 
unsolicited possible-offer announcements, and then expect that shareholders and other 
stakeholders of targets to exert pressure on the targets, if being acquired is a good 
choice from their perspective. In either case, possible offers may prompt more intensive 
competition from other potential competitors and give a precise signal to the stock 
market, so that the market considers the likelihood of formal bid later to be higher. 
Previous studies document well how investors trade on precise and imprecise 
rumors, either of which can lead to movement in the stock price of target firms (Dennis 
and McConnel 1986; Bommel 2003). When investigating the returns and pricing of 
rumored target firms, Chou, Tian, and Yin (2015) find that larger abnormal returns 
around the date of a rumor’s publication can signal a greater probability that the rumor 
will be followed by a formal bid. King (2009) shows that insiders trading on inside 
information trigger abnormal returns and abnormal turnovers of target firms prior to 
formal deal announcements. A possible offer delivers reliable information to the market, 
so that investors can trade on it; it also facilitates market anticipation regarding a higher 
probability of an upcoming solid bid. Hence, putting out a possible-offer announcement 
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tends to significantly increase the target shareholder returns around the possible-offer 
announcement date. 
Mulherin and Simsir (2015) expand the definition of ‘original date announced’ 
(ODA) to the date on which an initial merger-related event is released, and they 
compare the announcement returns around the newly defined ODA and the formal-offer 
announcement date. Our definition of ‘possible-offer announcement date’ is consistent 
with Mulherin and Simsir’s (2015) definition of ‘ODA.’ We hand-collect the possible-
offer announcement date for each deal, if applicable, and examine the effect on stock 
returns of releasing possible-offer news; we do so after controlling for firm-specific and 
deal-specific characteristics. This multivariate analysis has not been executed in 
previous research. 
Moreover, different types of bidders announce possible deals to send different 
kinds of information to the stock market. The market may react more strongly to 
possible-offer announcements by financial bidders, compared to those by other bidder 
types. As Renneboog et al. (2007) illustrate, when target firms are acquired by PE firms, 
the target’s abnormal returns at one day prior to the deal announcement and 10 days 
around the deal announcement are 22.68 percentage points and 25.53 percentage points, 
respectively. Indeed, these returns are rather higher than the takeover returns of targets 
in a general context.3 Additionally, given that financial bidders are generally considered 
less likely to release possible offers, possible-offer announcements by financial bidders 
may impose a relatively stronger shock on the stock market. Hence, we put forward 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, as follows. 
Hypothesis 2a: Possible-offer announcements generate significantly higher 
wealth gains for target shareholders. 
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Hypothesis 2b: Possible-offer announcements by financial bidders generate 
significantly higher wealth gains for target shareholders than do those by other bidders.  
The traditional method of estimating the returns on a deal announcement does 
not consider the impact of offering a possible deal; this can lead to estimation bias on 
the target shareholder returns on a formal deal announcement (Mulherin and Simir 
2015). For takeovers featuring possible offers, the stock price of targets may not 
overshoot to the formal-offer announcement, because there has been a market response 
captured by the stock price during the prebid period with the possible-offer 
announcement. In contrast, in the absence of an earlier disclosure of takeover 
discussions, a formal-offer announcement is expected to impose a stronger shock to the 
stock market, and this leads to higher formal-offer announcement returns to target firms. 
From the perspective of information signals, information released by both 
targets and bidders help with mitigating adverse selection problems (Humphery-Jenner, 
Sautner, and Suchard 2017). By focusing on the signaling role of PE-backed takeovers, 
Humphery-Jenner et al. (2017) suggest that PE-backed acquirers with bidding 
experience and networks positively shape the market’s anticipation of a deal’s quality, 
especially when the targets are in poor-quality information environments. Ceteris 
paribus, if financial bidders announce possible offers before formal offers, then the 
stock market is expected to have a more optimistic response toward possible-offer 
announcements, relative to formal-offer announcements. In another words, the stock 
market is expected to be less shocked by formal takeovers undertaken by financial 
bidders. Hence, we put forward Hypotheses 3a and 3b, as follows. 
Hypothesis 3a: Target’s shareholders receive significantly lower wealth gains from 




Hypothesis 3b: Target firms approached by financial bidders with initial possible offers 
experience significantly lower wealth gains through formal offer announcements.  
The increase in target stock price in the pre-bid period may increase the bidding 
costs of bidders. Schwert (1996; 2000) suggests and supports the ‘mark-up pricing 
hypothesis’ by observing that bidders systematically mark up the offer price so that 
higher target run-ups lead to higher offer premiums. The market’s anticipation of a 
formal offer is lifted by the announcement of a possible offer; this is one of the reasons 
why a price increases around the time of a possible-offer announcement. In the pre-bid 
period, shareholder returns are expected to strikingly increase around the time of the 
possible offer. Given this expectation, although the price increase did not occur in the 
period immediately preceding the date of the formal takeover offer, the offer premiums 
of takeovers with possible offers are expected to be higher when formal takeovers 
follow possible-offer disclosure. 
As to the impact of financial bidders, because they have fewer concerns of 
posttakeover synergies, financial bidders are less willing to overpay. However, 
competition or latent competition during the negotiation period can boost the offer 
premiums (Aktas et al. 2010). To secure their fund management reputation, in cases 
where earlier takeover disclosure has attracted more intensive competition, financial 
bidders may therefore need to bid for higher premiums to secure the success of bids in 
formal takeovers. Therefore, we put forward Hypotheses 4a and 4b, as follows. 
Hypothesis 4a: Possible-offer announcements prior to formal offers enable the 
target’s shareholders to gain higher bid premiums.  
Hypothesis 4b: Financial bidders make incremental and positive contributions 
to the relationship between possible offers and bid premiums. 
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4. Sample and descriptive statistics 
Takeovers announced from 2006 to 2016 in the UK are collected from the SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions Database. The first criterion for selection is that all target firms should be publicly 
traded, while acquirers could be public firms, private firms or subsidiaries. Deals with target 
companies assigned to the finance and utility industries (Standard Industry Classification [SIC] 
code: 6000 to 6999 and 4900 to 4999) are excluded. We also request that the initial toehold plus 
shareholding sought by bidders needs to be higher than 50 percent of the total shareholding of 
the target firms. Deals announced by multiple bidders before the resolution of the first bid are 
identified as auctions. In this circumstance, only the first bidder’s approach is included. 990 
sample deals are collected after requesting all criteria above.  
The SDC Platinum provides information on the date of a possible deal announcement 
and the number of days between the dates of informal the formal offers. However, Mulherin and 
Simsir (2015) indicate that the actual pre-merger activities is more than double the frequency of 
the events recorded in the SDC database. In this research, to overcome this potential problem 
caused by missing data, we manually collect the dates of possible offers where applicable and 
formal offers from the published documents recorded in the PI Navigator database. Compared 
with the accessible data reported by SDC, we also recognise that the SDC fails to capture all 
information about events of releasing possible offers and dates.4 
Table 1 represents the yearly distribution of takeovers with and without possible offers. 
Of the 990 sample deals, 409 are initiated by a possible offer. The intensity of possible offers is 
calculated as follows: the number of takeovers with a possible offer scaled by the total number 
of takeovers in the corresponding year. Table 1 shows that the intensity of announcing possible 
offer decreases significantly from 2011 to 2012, which signals that the 28-day PUSU clause 
deter possible offers. 
Firms’ stock prices and accounting information are collected from the Datastream 
database. Deal-specific characteristics are collected from the SDC. To avoid the potential bias 
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caused by missing observations in SDC (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004), we look 
through the original documents on deal offers stored in PI Navigator and manually collect the 
initial and final offer prices to indemnify the completeness and accuracy of offer price records. 
712 out of 990 sample deals have disclosed offer price based on our hand-collected data. 
Table 2 shows the wealth gains on target shareholders for the full sample, and the 
subsamples of takeovers with and without a possible offer. The significance of statistical 
difference test for the mean (median) values of variables for takeovers with and without a 
possible offer is noted in the columns of the mean (median) values of takeovers without a 
possible offer.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of three-day CARs around the date 
of possible offer announcement. We measure wealth gains using cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) during the windows [-1, +1] (CAR_3DAY) and [-2, +2] (CAR_5DAY) around the date 
of possible offer announcements. On average, target shareholders improve their wealth gains by 
22.69 percentage points. We then match the formal announcement dates for deals with and 
without possible offers. Panel A shows that 90 deals with possible offers can find corresponding 
deals without possible offers that are formally announced on the same day from the sample 
pool. When target firms are initially approached by possible offers, the average abnormal 
returns around the date of offering possible takeveors (26.88 percent) are significantly higher 
than those of other targets (7.94 percent). Whereas, targets initially approached by possible 
offers receive significantly less returns (13.26 percent) from formal offer announcement later.  
Panel B of Table 2 demonstrates the univariate analysis of CARs around the date of 
announcing a formal offer and bid premiums. The calculation of deal announcement returns 
follows the standard estimation method. It equals the CARs during the window [-1, +1] 
(CAR_3DAY) and [-2, +2] (CAR_5DAY) around the date of the formal deal announcements. 
The first (final) bid premium presented in Table 2 is calculated as the difference between the 
first (final) offer price and the target share price on 41 days before the formal deal 
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announcement date scaled by the share price on 41 days before the formal offer announcement 
date (e.g. Betton et al., 2009). 
Panel B presents on average, shareholders of target firms can generate 15.65 (16.46) 
percent CARs over a three-day (five-day) window around the date of announcing a formal deal. 
Target shareholders generate slightly higher CARs through formal deal announcement if no 
possible offer has been announced to public earlier. We also observe that, on average, the first 
and final premiums received by targets of takeovers with a possible offer are 30.37 percent and 
32.89 percent respectively, which are slightly higher than those of takeovers without a possible 
offer. This slight difference is also shown when looking at the median value of bid premiums.   
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the firm-specific and deal-specific 
characteristics of the full sample and the subsamples with and without a possible offer. Similar 
as Table 2, the significance of statistical difference test of the mean (median) values of the 
variables for takeovers with possible offers and without possible offer is noted in the columns 
for the mean (median) values of takeovers without a possible offer. 43.03 percent of UK 
takeovers are initiated by financial bidders (FIN_BIDDER), which is higher than the proportion 
in Gorbenko and Malenko’s (2014) study using US deals. The difference test shows that 
significantly fewer financial bidders announce possible offers compared with non-financial 
bidders. We observe that only 30.71 percent of takeovers in the full sample completed after 
2011 (POST_REFORM). This implies that the reform in 2011 may effectively reduce the 
potential threat of a firm being taken over. Roughly 27.14 percent of sample takeovers are 
approached by possible offers in the post-reform period. This is significantly lower than the 
percentage of being targeted without a possible offer (33.22 percent). We also observe that 
takeovers with and without possible offers have no difference with regard of the size of target 
firm (TARGET_SIZE). Moreover, firms that are approached by an initial possible offer have a 
significantly lower previous sales growth (SALES_GROWTH) and liquidity ratio 




5. Main empirical results 
In this section, we present the regression results. We first explore the determinants of 
possible-offer announcements and, in particular, how financial bidders choose between 
possible-offer and formal-offer announcements. Following this, we exploit how the 
stock market responds to the release of possible offers and formal offers. As the choice 
of financial bidders in making possible offers (or not) conveys different information to 
the stock market, we also investigate the incremental contribution of financial bidders to 
the effects of possible offers on stock price. Finally, we investigate whether formal bid 
premiums are distinctively higher when potential takeover discussions are disclosed 
earlier through the media. 
5.1. Financial bidders and the likelihood of possible-offer announcements 
To investigate the likelihood that a possible offer will be announced, we use probit 
regression with the indicator of possible offers (POSSIBLE_OFFER) as a dependent 
variable, and the indicators of financial bidder (FIN_BIDDER) and postreform period 
(POST_REFORM) as independent variables of interest. We control for the target firm’s 
size (TARGET_SIZE), age (AGE), average sales growth (SALE_GROWTH), Tobin’s 
q (Q_RATIO), liquidity (LIQUIDITY), leverage (LEVERAGE), tangibility 
(TANGIBILITY), the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA_SD), Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI), and the threat of being acquired (TAKEOVER_THREAT)5 
(Ambrose and Megginson 1992; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012; 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2014). For the purpose of accounting for the time-invariant 
effects of the corresponding industry, we use the industry fixed effect based on the 
firm’s two-digit SIC codes. Since the years featuring a high risk of being taken over 
(TAKEOVER_THREAT) and the post-reform period (POST_REFORM) capture the 
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exogenous shock to the takeover market, we do not additionally control for the year 
fixed effect to preclude multicollinearity. 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the likelihood of initiating a takeover 
through a possible-offer announcement, conditional on making a formal-offer 
announcement. In Table 4, the marginal effect of financial bidders indicates that they 
are 8.51 percent less likely to announce possible offers; this finding aligns with 
Hypothesis 1a. Financial bidders with strong expertise in searching for target firms and 
evaluating firm value are capable of making formal bids directly, so as to avoid early 
competitors. Alternatively, within a voluntary reporting system and with regard to fund 
information, financial bidders, especially PE firms, are more willing to withhold private 
negotiations until they decide to make a firm bid. 
The significant and negative marginal effect of POST_REFORM shows that the 
likelihood of being approached with a possible offer is 12.14 percentage points lower 
than in the pre-reform period. This affirms the conjecture of Hypothesis 1b, and it 
suggests that the newly added 28-day PUSU clause in the updated Takeover Code limits 
the bidder’s interests in approaching targets with earlier possible offers.    
5.2. Deal announcement returns through possible offers  
Table 5 presents the regression results for the effects of possible offers and financial 
bidders on the abnormal returns around the possible-offer announcement date. These 
regressions use the matched sample with or without possible offers, but while 
announcing formal offers on the same dates. Hence, 180 takeovers are used for the 
examination. All controls including those for year and industry fixed effects are 
employed. The material and positive coefficient of POSSIBLE_OFFER indicates that 
target firms generate significantly higher abnormal returns by putting out an 
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announcement of potential takeover discussions; this supports Hypothesis 2a. In 
economic terms, by announcing possible offers, the deal announcement returns of the 
targets increase by 15.07 percentage points. In conjunction with the mean value of the 
three-day CARs around the possible offers (Table 2), the impact of possible offers is 
both economically and statistically significant. However, the insignificant coefficient of 
FIN_BIDDER indicates that being approached by a financial bidder does not lead to a 
strikingly different market response. 
In Model 2 of Table 5, we investigate the incremental effect of financial bidders 
on the relationship between possible offers and shareholder returns, using the 
difference-in-difference (DiD) methodology. Thus, we introduce the interaction 
between the indicators of possible offers and of financial bidders 
(POSSIBLE_OFFER*FIN_BIDDER). As presaged in Hypothesis 2b, the positive and 
significant coefficient before the interaction illustrates that when possible takeovers are 
negotiated with financial bidders, target shareholders can yield significantly higher 
CARs around the time of the possible-offer announcement. Economically, deals 
involving financial bidders with possible offers gain additionally higher abnormal 
returns by 12.56 percentage points, compared to other types of deals. Since financial 
bidders are not supposed to release possible takeover discussions before a firm bid is 
made, the market may experience a stronger shock whenever bidders announce possible 
offers; this in turn causes higher stock price volatilities.     
5.3. Deal announcement returns through formal offers 
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Table 6 presents the regression results for the effects of possible offers and financial 
bidders on abnormal returns around the formal-offer announcement date. All controls 
including year and industry fixed effects are employed. 
Model 1 of Table 6 presents the effects for the full sample. The significantly 
negative coefficient on POSSIBLE_OFFER suggests that target shareholders obtain 
significantly lower wealth gains when a formal announcement follows a possible-offer 
announcement. Economically, targets with possible offers, on average, generate lower 
deal announcement returns by 3.92 percentage points, compared to their counterparts. 
Together with the positive association between a possible-offer announcement and the 
shareholder returns around the time of the possible-offer announcement, our 
interpretation is that, due to the earlier reaction of the stock market to the possible-offer 
announcement, the stock market has less resilience when the formal offer is eventually 
announced. This also underscores the cogency of the opinion that one should consider a 
possible offer a strong signal of an eventual formal bid, so that the announcement of a 
formal offer is not as surprising to the stock market as it would have been in the absence 
of this strong signal. These results support Hypothesis 3a. According to the insignificant 
coefficient of FIN_BIDDER, there is no prominent difference in the offer 
announcement returns of takeovers undertaken by financial bidders and those 
undertaken by strategic bidders. 
Model 2 in Table 6 shows the DiD regression results based on the matched 
sample. To control for the potential endogeneity caused by the firm’s decision to 
announce a possible offer, we use the propensity score matching (PSM) methodology6 
to match takeovers with a possible offer (409 deals) and takeovers without a possible 
offer. The matching variables are target firm size (TARGET_SIZE), market-to-book 
ratio (Q_RATIO), firm leverage (LEVERAGE), a financial bidder dummy 
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(FIN_BIDDER), and deal announcement year. The mean value of the percentage bias 
after matching is less than 5 percentage points. Based on the matched sample, we 
construct the DiD regression by employing the interaction between the indicators of 
possible offer and financial bidder. The insignificant coefficient before the interaction 
(POSSIBLE_OFFER*FIN_BIDDER) indicates no striking additional effect of financial 
bidders on the relationship between possible offers and CARs. Hence, Hypothesis 3b is 
not supported. All results in Tables 5 and 6 are robust when CARs are measured in 
terms of the five-day event window around the deal announcement (unreported). 
5.4. Offer premiums 
According to the mark-up pricing hypothesis, higher pre-bid target price run-ups are 
expected to increase the offer premiums that target firms receive as a part of formal 
takeovers. The aforementioned results demonstrate higher abnormal returns around the 
possible-offer announcements generated by possible offers. Although this price increase 
is not in the run-up period immediately preceding the formal-offer announcement date, 
it still very possible to influence the formal bid price. Therefore, we examine whether 
possible offers that prompted earlier target shareholder returns increase the bidding 
costs (i.e., measured by higher bid premiums).   
Table 7 presents the regression results of the effects of possible-offer 
announcements and financial bidders on bid premiums; Panel A (Panel B) features 
those with dependent variables of initial (final) bid premiums. The control variables 
accord with those used in previous studies that investigate the determinants of deal 
premiums (e.g., Schwert 2000; Moeller et al. 2004; Betton et al. 2014). In line with the 
measure used by Betton et al. (2009), when running regressions, the first (final) bid 
premiums are calculated via the natural logarithm of the ratio of the first (final) offer 
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price and the target share price in the 41 days prior to the formal-offer announcement 
date. Model 1 in Panel A shows a significantly positive coefficient on 
POSSIBLE_OFFER. When the target side can negotiate for a higher price, the first-bid 
premiums increase by 21.74 percentage points, relative to the others. The result implies 
support of Hypothesis 4a—namely, that for offerors, higher prebid stock returns lead to 
higher bidding costs. Moreover, the negative (albeit insignificant) coefficient of 
financial bidders indicates that financial bidders tend to be capable of arguing for a 
relatively low offer price. However, the price difference between financial bidders and 
strategic bidders is limited. When using financial premiums in Model 1 of Panel B, the 
results are fairly consistent. 
Model 2 in Panel A presents the joint effect of possible-offer announcements 
and financial bidders (POSSIBLE_OFFER*FIN_BIDDER) on first premiums, using the 
DiD model. We employ PSM to match deals initiated by possible offers with deals 
initiated solely by formal offers.7 The significant and positive coefficient before the 
interaction term indicates that financial bidders who choose to approach target firms 
with possible offers need first to pay significantly higher bid prices than those who bid 
solely through formal offers. This implies that the public disclosure of possible offers 
by financial bidders has incremental benefits for the target side of takeovers, by 
enabling the target side to argue for a relatively high offer price. The higher premiums 
paid by financial bidders may be further explained by the fact that earlier disclosures of 
takeover discussions attract investors’ trade in the information and higher deal 
competition in the pre-public negotiation period; however, given their concerns 
regarding their own fund management reputation, financial bidders may choose to bid 




When shedding light on final premiums (Model 2 in Panel B), we also note that 
for takeovers where a financial bidder announces its possible bid interests before 
making a formal bid, the shareholders of the target firm tend to receive significantly 
higher final premiums, irrespective of whether the first bidders eventually pay the final 
price. Hypothesis 4b is supported by these results. 
In the regressions in Tables 5–7, we control for the post-reform period 
(POST_REFORM). We find that the reform inherent in the Takeover Code of 2011 
significantly influences neither the target shareholder returns nor the bid premiums. 
These findings align with those of Restrepo and Subramanian (2017), who are skeptical 
of the efficiency of the reform inherent in the Takeover Code.  
6. Further analysis 
Substantial changes were made in September 2011 to the UK Takeover Code; those 
changes sought to rebalance the bargaining power between targets and bidders in deal 
negotiations. One of the newly added clauses in the regulatory change is the 28-day 
PUSU period, which exclusively constrains the behavior of offerors who initially 
approach targets with possible offers. Our aforementioned results demonstrate that in 
the post-reform period, the probability of a takeover drops markedly when an earlier 
possible-offer disclosure had been made. These results alone, however, cannot affirm 
the reform’s effect on the wealth gains of target shareholders. In this section, we first 
directly compare the pending periods for target firms before and after the reform, by 
plotting the estimated Kaplan–Meier hazard function (i.e., the risk of being made a 
formal offer).9 Subsequently, to account for the potential structure break in this natural-
experiment environment, we investigate the role of possible offers on the wealth effects 
of targets in each of the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
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Additionally, the financial bidders’ willingness to pay depends on the state of 
aggregate economic conditions (e.g., Gorbenko and Malenko 2014). When financial 
bidders are highly valuated, the cost of debt is lower when calculated by the credit 
spread. Therefore, we are interested in exploring how macroeconomic conditions affect 
the premiums paid by financial bidders. 
6.1. The Reform in the Takeover Code of 2011 
Figures 2a and 2b present the hazard failure rate in the days following a possible-offer 
announcement, using deals made before and after the reform. Prior to the regulatory 
change, the maximum days in the pending period from the possible offer to the formal 
offer is 1,156 days (approximately four months). The hazard failure rate surges during 
the first 250 days following the possible offer; this means that, in the first 250 days, 
target firms are most likely to end the pending period by receiving a formal offer. 
However, some firms still suffer from a long period of hesitation, which ceases when 
they receive a final formal offer; this potentially influences, somewhat detrimentally, 
the daily operations of the target firms. Turning to the post-reform takeovers, we find 
that the maximum number of days in the pending period is 330 days. Compared to that 
seen in the pre-reform takeovers, the length of this period is effectively limited by the 
28-day PUSU clause. Moreover, Figure 2b shows that after the reform, in the first 50 
days, many target firms receive formal offers. From about 50 days after the possible-
offer announcement, the rate at which the hazard failure rate increases gradually 
attenuates. 
When revisiting the role of possible offers on offer announcement returns and 
bid premiums both before and after the year of reform, some interesting results emerge. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the effects of possible offers on shareholder returns around 
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the time of formal-offer announcements and bid premiums, using pre-reform takeovers. 
In Models 1, 2, and 3, the dependent variables are the CARs around the formal-offer 
announcement date, first-bid premiums, and final-offer premiums, respectively. 
Model 1 of Panel A suggests that CARs are not significantly lower if possible offers are 
released in an earlier stage. The striking and positive coefficients of 
POSSIBLE_OFFER in both Models 2 and 3 consistently demonstrate that in the years 
prior to the reform, the takeover bidders who reveal earlier potential takeover 
discussions needed to offer higher bid premiums. 
Panel B of Table 8 repeats these regressions, using post-reform takeover data.8 
Model 1 of Panel B shows that target shareholders gain significantly lower CARs if 
possible offers are announced in advance of formal offers. Models 2 and 3 of Panel B 
suggest that in the post-reform period, the bid premiums of takeovers with possible 
offers, irrespective of first or final-bid premiums, are not very different from those of 
takeovers lacking possible offers. This suggests that in the years following the reform, 
bidders have become more cautious about announcing potential takeover discussions, so 
as to avoid bidding for higher premiums. There may be two substantial reasons for the 
lower CARs that correspond to the formal takeover announcements. First, as explained 
above, earlier possible offers signal to the market a higher likelihood of a formal bid 
being offered, and so the market sustains less shock when a formal offer is eventually 
released. Second, in comparing the relationship between premiums and possible offers 
in Panels A and B of Table 8, for the post-reform periods, we can to some extent 
attribute the significantly lower CARs around the formal offers to the relatively lower 
premiums. Overall, our results suggest a time-variant structure break with regard to the 
function of offering possible bids. 
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Additionally, we note that in the 28 days prior to a formal-offer announcement, 
certain corporate behavior, such as sales and purchases of assets and market 
manipulation through rumor and information leakage. These activities may affect target 
firms’ price volatilities and takeover outcomes. For instance, Cumming et al. (2016) 
find that the presence of market manipulation (including both end-of-day price 
dislocation and information leakage) reduces both the deal completion rate and the 
premiums that the target receives. In contrast, our results indicate that automatic and 
official disclosure of possible takeover discussions increase the premiums paid to the 
target. This finding empirically supports the natural difference between possible-offer 
announcements and market manipulation. 
6.2. Financial bidders and aggregate economic conditions 
Aggregate economic conditions are measured by the credit spread (Gorbenko and 
Malenko 2014). Like Gorbenko and Malenko (2014), we use the difference between the 
average 10-year yield of UK Benchmark AAA bonds in the last year of the deal 
announcement and the average 10-year UK Government Stored yield in the same period 
as the measure of the credit spread. To investigate how market conditions incrementally 
affect the premiums of deals involving financial bidders, we additionally include the 
credit spread (CREDIT_SPREAD) and the interaction of FIN_BIDDER and 
CREDIT_SPREAD (FIN_BIDDER*CREDIT_SPREAD) as variables in the regressions 
of the first and financial deal premiums.  
Table 9 presents the estimation results of deal premiums after considering the 
market conditions in various years. The dependent variables of Models 1 and 2 are the 
first and final premiums, respectively. We note that a higher CREDIT_SPREAD value 
(representing a higher debt cost for the investor) leads to higher first premiums, rather 
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than final premiums, that financial bidders will offer. The insignificant coefficients on 
the interactions in both models indicate that, consistently, the market conditions do not 
additionally influence the financial bidders’ decisions on how much they are willing to 
pay for the targets. These results release our concern regarding the different 
performance level of financial bidders in different market conditions. 
7. Conclusion 
The current study is the first to examine the effects of making possible offers before 
formal bids on takeover gains, based on a natural-experiment design. Using UK 
takeovers, we find that in the years following the ‘put-up or shut-up’ (PUSU) reform, 
bidders, especially financial bidders, are less interested in disclosing possible takeover 
discussion before announcing formal takeovers. The stock market significantly and 
positively responds to possible-offer announcements, while the target shareholders of 
takeovers with possible offers generate lower abnormal returns through formal-offer 
announcements. Perhaps a possible offer signals to the market the higher probability of 
a formal bid being offered; thus, if a possible offer had already been earlier revealed, the 
market sustains less shock when a formal offer is published. Moreover, we find that the 
disclosure of potential takeover discussions leading to higher target price run-ups 
contributes positively to the bid premiums, which means that it adds to the bidders’ 
bidding costs. 
Our empirical results provide only weak evidence of the incremental 
contribution of financial bidders to the association between possible offers and 
shareholder returns around either possible offers or formal offers. However, the 
publication of possible bid interests helps target shareholders obtain significantly higher 
bid premiums; this effect is even more striking when a possible offer is made by a 
financial bidder. This means that while financial bidders have less of an interest in 
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bidding with an initial possible offer, when they do, they will need to pay higher 
premiums to their targets. Furthermore, when considering whether the offer price that 
financial bidders pay for targets is influenced by macroeconomic conditions, our results 
allow us release this concern by presenting the insignificantly incremental effect of 
credit spread. 
Finally, our results show that the reform inherent in the Takeover Code of 2011 
greatly truncates the pending period from the possible-offer announcement date to the 
formal-offer announcement date. Nonetheless, the reform has no impact on the wealth 
gains of target firms. By separately examining the role of possible offers on the wealth 
effect of targets and comparing them before and after the year of reform, we find that 
the reform inherent in the Takeover Code imposes a time-variant structure break. In the 
pre-reform period, improved bid premiums caused by possible offers may explain the 
higher shareholder returns generated by formal takeover announcements. However, the 
Takeover Code reform and especially its 28-day PUSU clause triggers the negative 
effect that possible-offer announcements have on the wealth gains of targets through 











1. An anecdotal evidence hampered by the 28-day PUSU is the deal transaction between J 
Sainsbury plc (Sainsbury’s), the second largest chain of supermarkets in the UK and Home Retail 
Group plc (HRG), a home and general merchandise retailer in the UK completed on 2 September 
2016. Sainsbury’s confirmed its earlier approach to HRG regarding a possible offer on 5 January 
2016 and the detail of the consideration was given on 2 February 2016. Another competitor, 
Steinhoff International Holdings NV (Steinhoff) announced the terms of possible offer to HRG 
on 19 February 2016. Following this, both Sainsbury’s and Steinhoff were requested to express 
an intention of making a formal offer by 18 March 2016. On 18 March 2016, Sainsbury’s 
announced its intention to offer a formal bid for HRG, but Steinhoff chose to terminate the 
takeover discussion. 
2. As it will be seen later in the paper, 90 takeovers with possible offers can find matching 
takeovers without possible offers when requesting the dates of formal offers of matching deals 
are the same. This process results in 180 takeovers.   
3. Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013) present the 3-day deal announcement returns 
of target firms using takeovers of public targets by private and public acquirers undertaken 
between 1990 and 2007. The target shareholder returns are 20.32 percent on average. 
4. Mulherin and Simsir (2015) state that the SDC platinum does not record all ‘Original Date 
Announced’ (ODA) of US takeovers. According to their research, ODA is the date when ‘… the 
target company is first publicly disclosed as a possible takeover candidate.’ It is the same date of 
what I mean in this paper by the date of possible deal announcement. 
5. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
6. Our results of DiD regressions in Tables 6 and 7 are robust if we further request the matching 
needs to be within the specified radius given by caliper of 0.01 (unreported). 
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7. The matching variables are consistent with those in Section 5.3.. The mean value of the 
percentage bias is less than five percentage. 
8. The hazard function is referred to Giot and Schwienbacher’s (2007) research, which exploits 
the possible exit options of venture capital-backed firms. 
9. We notice that the F-statistics tests are insignificant for Models 2 and 3 in Panel B of Table 8. 
When excluding industry and year fixed-effect, the results of the F-statistics tests are significant. 
The effect of announcing possible offers are robust if with or without  industry and year fixed-
effect in the regressions of bid premiums. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
POSSIBLE_OFFER Deals with possible offers. Binary variable for a takeover initiated by a possible 
offer before formal bid offer announced by the same bidder. 
FIN_BIDDER Deals approached by financial bidders (with SIC code from 6000 to 6999). Binary 
variable for a takeover approached by a financial bidder. 
POST_REFORM Post-reform period. Binary variable for a takeover announced after the reform of 
the City Code in 2011 from the SDC Platinum database. 
TARGET_SIZE Target firm size. Market value of equity minus book value of equity plus book 
value of total assets in nominal terms. For the reporting period end before the 
(latent) acquisition announcement year from the Datastream database. In million 
dollar units and real (2016) terms. 
AGE Firm age. (Latent) acquisition announcement year minus base year in the 
Datastream database (minimum 1964) plus one. 
SALE_GROWTH Growth rate of sales. Average growth rate of sales for a maximum of three and a 
minimum of two reporting period ends before the (latent) acquisition 
announcement year from the Datastream database. Sales are annualized and in real 
(2016) terms. 
Q_RATIO Market to book ratio. Firm size in market value divided by from size in book value. 
For the reporting period end before the (latent) acquisition announcement year from 
the Datastream database. 
LIQUIDITY Liquidity ratio. Cash and marketable securities divided by firm size in book value 
in nominal terms. For the reporting period end before the (latent) acquisition 
announcement year from the Datastream database.  
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio. Book value of total debt divided by firm size in book value in 
nominal terms. For the reporting period end before the (latent) acquisition 
announcement year from the Datastream database. 
TANGIBILITY Tangibility ratio. Book value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by 
firm size in book value in nominal terms. For the reporting period end before the 
(latent) acquisition announcement year from the Datastream database. 
ROA Return on assets. Operating incomes plus depreciation (annualized) divided by firm 
size in book value in nominal terms. For the reporting period end before the (latent) 
acquisition announcement year from the Datastream database. 
ROA_SD Volatility of return on assets. Standard deviation of ROA for a maximum of three 
and a minimum of two reporting period ends before the (latent) acquisition 
announcement year.  
HHI Herfindahl index. Industry listed firm concentration. Herfindahl index for the 
shares of sales (annualized and in decimal units) for the Industry Classification 
Benchmark industry. For the reporting period end before the (latent) acquisition 
announcement year from the Datastream database. 
THREATS_TAKEOVER Takeover intensity peak. Binary variable for takeover intensity at least one standard 
deviation above the average takeover intensity. Takeover intensity is calculated by 
aggregate transaction value of takeovers in nominal term divided by aggregate 
value of listed firms in book value in nominal term for reporting period ends in the 
(latent) acquisition announcement year.     
TOEHOLD Percentage of shareholdings that the offeror owns in the target firm prior to the 




CASH_DEAL Cash deal. Binary variable for a takeover paid for all in cash from the SDC Platinum 
database. 
SHARE_DEAL Stock deal. Binary variable for a takeover paid for all in stock from the SDC 
Platinum database. 
PUB_PUB Public deal. Binary variable for a takeover offered by a public firm from the SDC 
Platinum database. 
PRI_PUB Private deal. Binary variable for a takeover offered by a private firm from the SDC 
Platinum database.  
DOMESTIC Domestic deal. Binary variable for a takeover offered by a firm from the same 
country as the target from the SDC Platinum database. 
HOSTILE Hostile deal. Binary variable for a hostile acquisition from the SDC Platinum 
database. 
IND_MATCH Industry match. Binary variables for a takeover offered by a firm from the industry 
with the same two-digit SIC code.  
CREDIT_SPREAD Aggregate economic condition. The difference between the average 10-year yield 
of UK Benchmark AAA bonds in the last year of the deal announcement and the 
average 10-year UK Government Stored yield in the same period. 
FIRST_PREMIUM First offer premium. The difference between the first offer price to each share of 
the target and the target share price 41 day prior to the identified offer 
announcement date divided by the target share price 41 days prior to the identified 
offer date.   
FINAL_PREMIUM Final offer premium. The difference between the final offer price to each share of 
the target and the target share price 41 day prior to the identified offer 
announcement date divided by the target share price 41 days prior to the identified 
offer date.   
CAR_3DAY 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 3-day CARs around the identified 
offer announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the market 
model. The estimation window is over the period of 242 to 42 trading days prior to 
the identified takeover announcement date. 
CAR_5DAY 5-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 5-day CARs around the identified 
offer announcement date. Abnormal returns are calculated based on the market 
model. The estimation window is over the period of 242 to 42 trading days prior to 










Appendix B. A case of takeover with possible offer announcement 
In the final document of the recommended cash offer for European Motor Holdings (EMH) plc 
by Inchcape plc, it records the full history of the negotiation process of the deal. On page 9, it states 
‘…on 4 December 2006, the day before EMH confirms that it was in discussions with interested parties 
in relation to a possible offer for EMH.’  
When tracking the record of this takeover, on 5th December, 2006, there was a document 
acknowledging the announcement of possible offer from EMH. ‘…EMH notes the recent press 





Figure 1 Negotiation process of UK takeovers 
This figure presents the whole negotiation process of a takeover in the UK. Before the date of possible offer 
announcement, it is defined as private negotiation. The period between the dates of recognized rumor and 
possible offer announcement is defined as pre-public negotiation. The period from the date of announcing 

























Figure 2 Survival Analysis: The effect of 28-day PUSU in the updated Takeover Code   
This figure plots the hazard failure rate estimated by the Kaplan-Meier hazard function using takeovers 
undertaken in pre- and post- reform. Figure 2a plots the risk of being formally taken over at days after the 
possible offer announcement in the pre-reform period. Figure 2b plots the risk of being formally taken over 
at days after the possible offer announcement in the post-reform period. 
 
Figure 2a Pre-reform hazard rate function 
 




Table 1 Distribution of takeovers by years 
This table presents the distribution of takeovers by years from 2006 to 2016. It also presents the distribution of two sub-samples of takeovers: with possible offer 
and without possible offer. The final column is possible offer intensity in each year. Intensity of possible offer is calculated by the number of takeovers with 
possible offer being scaled by the total number of takeovers in corresponding year. 
Year  No. of Takeovers  With Possible Offer  Without Possible Offer  Intensity of Possible Offer 
2006  140  18  122  0.1286 
2007  129  72  57  0.5581 
2008  145  84  61  0.5793 
2009  93  48  45  0.5161 
2010  99  42  57  0.4242 
2011  80  34  46  0.4250 
2012  68  20  48  0.2941 
2013  41  17  24  0.4146 
2014  62  24  38  0.3871 
2015  63  31  32  0.4921 
2016  70  19  51  0.2714 











Table 2 Descriptive statistics of wealth gains of target shareholders  
This table presents descriptive statistics for possible deal announcement returns, formal deal announcement returns and bid premiums. Panel A presents the 3-
day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the window [-1, +1], where day 0 is the possible-offer announcement date. 409 out of 990 takeovers have possible 
offer announcement before formal one. By matching formal deal announcement dates of takeovers with and without possible offers, 90 takeovers with possible 
offers successfully find corresponding takeovers without possible offers. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of wealth gains of target’s shareholders 
represented by price runup in the period leading up to a formal offer, deal announcement returns of formal offers and bid premiums. 3-day (5-day) CARs are 
CARs around the identified offer announcement date over the window [-1, +1] ([-2, +2]). Abnormal returns are calculated based on the market model. The 
estimation window is over the period of 242 to 42 trading days prior to the formal takeover announcement date. The first (final) premium is calculated by the 
difference between the first (final) offer price to each share of the target and the target share price 41 day prior to the identified offer announcement date being 
divided by the target share price 41 days prior to the formal offer date. Where there is no updated price, final price is equal to first price. This table also presents 
the value of CARs and premiums of two sub-samples: takeovers with and without possible offers. The significance of the differences of mean (median) values 
between two-subsamples are noticed in the column showing the mean (median) value of subsample without possible offer. a, b, and c indicate significance of 
mean (median) differences between takeovers with and without possible offer at the one, five and ten percent level respectively. 
 Subsample with Possible Offer Subsample without Possible Offer 
Panel A Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. No. of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. No. of Obs. 
CAR_3DAY_ 
POSSIBLE_OFFER (Sample with Possible 
Offer) 
0.2269 0.1837 0.2906 404 
    
CAR_3DAY_ 
POSSIBLE_OFFER (Matched Sample) 0.2688 0.1715 0.3782 90 0.0794
 a
 0.0063 0.2010 90 
CAR_3DAY (Matched Sample) 0.1326 0.0852 0.2184 90 0.2111
 a
 0.1102 0.3571 90 
Panel B Full Sample Sample with Possible Offer Sample without Possible Offer 













CAR_3DAY 0.1676 0.0904 0.2665 950 0.1565 0.0929 0.2451 398 0.1757 0.0869 0.2808 552 
CAR_5DAY 0.1727 0.1014 0.2735 950 0.1646 0.1035 0.2577 398 0.1785 0.0982 0.2844 552 
FIRST_PREMIUM 0.3350 0.2893 0.8086 712 0.3037 0.2533 0.8489 392 0.3732 0.3289 0.7560 320 




Table 3 Descriptive statistics of all variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of all variables for full sample, subsample with possible offer, and subsample without possible offer. Variables are 
defined in Appendix. The significance of the differences of mean (median) value between two subsamples are noticed in the column showing the mean (median) 
value of subsample without possible offer. a, b, and c indicate the significance of mean (median) differences between takeovers with and without possible offer at 
the one, five and ten percent level respectively. 
 Full Sample Subsample with Possible Offer Subsample without Possible Offer 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
No. of 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
No. of 
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
No. of 
Obs. 
FIN_BIDDER 0.4303 0.0000 0.4954 990 0.3961 0.0000 0.4897 409 0.4544 c  0.0000 c  0.4983 581 
POST_REFORM 0.3071 0.0000 0.4615 990 0.2714 0.0000 0.4452 409 0.3322 b 0.0000 b 0.4714 581 
TARGET_SIZE 7375.65 371.22 40926.07 877 4526.38 437.66 18769.39 375 9504.09 310.99 51527.09 502 
AGE 14.8271 10.0000 13.1641 989 14.6235 10.0000 12.9484 409 14.9707 10.0000 13.3233 580 
SALE_ 
GROWTH 0.5271 0.0884 2.0127 867 0.4486 0.1117 1.4137 367 0.5847 0.0787 c  2.3573 500 
LEVERAGE 0.1895 0.1491 0.1900 889 0.1887 0.1563 0.1816 379 0.1901 0.1433 0.1962 510 
LIQUIDITY 0.1675 0.0971 0.1900 891 0.1499 0.0856 0.1670 379 0.1805 b 0.1102 b 0.2046 512 
Q_RATIO 2.1396 1.7756 1.2310 877 2.0805 1.7488 1.1252 375 2.1838 1.8040 1.3038 502 
ROA 0.0108 0.0768 0.2787 878 0.0309 0.0835 0.2433 374 -0.0040 c 0.0676 c  0.3016 504 
ROA_SD 0.1133 0.0544 0.1903 905 0.0971 0.0506 0.1632 380 0.1251 b 0.0588 0.2071 525 
TANGIBILITY 0.2462 0.1292 0.2657 885 0.2491 0.1406 0.2615 378 0.2440 0.1228 0.2690 507 
HHI 0.4519 0.3730 0.2920 990 0.4569 0.3880 0.2953 409 0.4484 0.3730 0.2899 581 
TAKEOVER_ 
THREAT 0.3273 0.0000 0.4695 990 0.3570 0.0000 0.4797 409 0.3064 0.0000 0.4614 581 
TOEHOLD 4.3450 0.0000 11.1452 990 3.7570 0.0000 9.9563 409 4.7588 0.0000 11.9022 581 
CASH_DEAL 0.5111 1.0000 0.5001 990 0.5403 1.0000 0.4990 409 0.4905 0.0000 0.5003 581 
SHARE_DEAL 0.1051 0.0000 0.3068 990 0.1296 0.0000 0.3363 409 0.0878 b 0.0000 0.2832 581 
PUB_PUB 0.4172 0.0000 0.4933 990 0.4719 0.0000 0.4998 409 0.3787 a 0.0000 0.4855 581 
PRIV_PUB 0.2899 0.0000 0.4539 990 0.2543 0.0000 0.4360 409 0.3150 b 0.0000 0.4649 581 
DOMESTIC 0.4889 0.0000 0.5001 990 0.5012 1.0000 0.5006 409 0.4802 0.0000 0.5000 581 
HOSTILE 0.0242 0.0000 0.1539 990 0.0269 0.0000 0.1620 409 0.0224 0.0000 0.1480 581 
IND_MATCH 0.3818 0.0000 0.4861 990 0.3936 0.0000 0.4892 409 0.3735 0.0000 0.4841 581 
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Table 4 The determinants of possible-offer announcement 
This table presents the probit model results of the determinants of announcing possible offer conditional on 
having formal takeover announcement. The dependent variable is a binary variable, which equals 1 if 
possible offer is identified before formal offer; 0 otherwise. Independent variables are defined in Appendix. 
Industry fixed-effect is controlled. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, and c indicate the 
significance of coefficients and Wald statistics at the one, five  and ten percent levels respectively. 
Possible Offer  Marginal Effect  Std. Error 
FIN_BIDDER  -0.0851
b  0.0352 
POST_REFORM  -0.1214
a  0.0420 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  0.0100  0.0099 
AGE  -0.0024
c  0.0014 
SALE_GROWTH  -0.0110
  0.0086 
Q_RATIO  -0.0321
c  0.0189 
LIQUIDITY  -0.0209  0.1231 
LEVERAGE  -0.0778  0.1051 
TANGIBILITY  0.0790
  0.0734 
ROA_SD  -0.0729  0.1157 
HHI  0.0651  0.0702 
TAKEOVER_THREAT  0.1372
a  0.0414 
CONSTANT  0.4324
c  0.0171 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes   
Year fixed-effect  No   
Wald Chi2  39.17
a   
P-value of Wald test  0.004   
Pseudo R2  0.038   











Table 5 The regressions of deal announcement returns around possible-offer announcement  
This table presents the regression estimates for the effects of possible offer and financial bidders on possible 
offer announcement returns using matched sample takeovers (same formal offer date; with and without 
possible offer). The dependent variable is 3-day CARs around the possible deal announcement. Model 1 
presents the estimating results of the effects of possible offer and financial bidder on the CARs, individually. 
Model 2 presents the DiD regression results of the incremental effect of financial bidders on the association 
of possible offer and CARs. All variables are defined in Appendix. Industry and year fixed-effect are 
controlled. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, and c indicate the significance of 
coefficients and F statistics at the one, five  and ten percent level respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 






FIN_BIDDER  -0.0064 0.0566 -0.0533 0.0693 
POSSIBLE_OFFER* 
FIN_BIDDER 
   0.1256
c 
0.0744 
POST_REFORM  -0.0107 0.0988 -0.0523 0.1093 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0072 0.0112 -0.0072 0.0109 








 0.0245 -0.0369 0.0242 











SHARE_DEAL  -0.0595 0.0541 -0.0275 0.0557 
PUB_PUB  -0.0427 0.0588 -0.0271 0.0575 
PRIV_PUB  -0.0845 0.0572 -0.0782 0.0552 
DOMESTIC  0.0011 0.0412 -0.0003 0.0384 
HOSTILE  0.0791 0.0861 0.0744 0.0780 
IND_MATCH  -0.0763 0.0516 -0.0703 0.0495 
CONSTANT  0.1207 0.1656 0.1382 0.1627 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed-effect  Yes  Yes  
F-statistics  6.03a  5.11a  
P-value of F-statistics  0.000  0.000  
R2  0.354  0.371  




Table 6 The regressions of deal announcement returns around formal-offer announcement 
This table presents the regression estimates for the effects of possible offer and financial bidders on formal 
offer announcement returns using full sample. The dependent variable is 3-day CARs around the deal 
announcement. Model 1 presents the results of the effects of possible offer and financial bidder on the CARs, 
individually. Model 2 presents the DiD regression results of the incremental effect of financial bidders on 
the association of possible offer and CARs based on the matched sample using PSM method. All variables 
are defined in Appendix. Industry and year fixed-effect are controlled. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity. a, b, c indicate the significance of coefficients and F statistics at the one, five  and ten 
percent level respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2 
CARs  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
POSSIBLE_OFFER  -0.0392
b  0.0196  -0.0573
b  0.0250 
FIN_BIDDER  -0.0241  0.0309  0.0323  0.0501 
POSSIBLE_OFFER* 
FIN_BIDDER 
     -0.0428  0.0460 
POST_REFORM  0.0190
 
 0.0444  -0.0436  0.1063 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0105
c
  0.0056  -0.0114
c  0.0063 
LEVERAGE  -0.0454  0.0592  -0.0571  0.0591 
ROA  0.0325  0.0553  -0.0056  0.0546 
Q_RATIO  -0.0102  0.0071  -0.0195
a  0.0072 
HHI  -0.0649  0.0459  -0.0632  0.0434 
TOEHOLD  -0.0019
b  0.0008  -0.0030
a  0.0008 
CASH_DEAL  0.1360
a  0.0233  0.1539
a  0.0235 
SHARE_DEAL  -0.0132  0.0255  0.0033  0.0283 
PUB_PUB  -0.0472  0.0316  -0.0491  0.0344 
PRIV_PUB  -0.0805
a  0.0296  -0.1165
a  0.0369 
DOMESTIC  -0.0267  0.0213  -0.0104  0.0265 
HOSTILE  0.0196  0.0480  0.0592  0.0505 
IND_MATCH  -0.0122  0.0246  -0.0454
c  0.0258 
CONSTANT  0.3425
a  0.0781  0.5161
a  0.1355 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  5.75a    5.74a   
P-value of F-statistics  0.000    0.000   
R2  0.166    0.213   











Table 7 The regressions of first and final bid premiums 
This table presents the regression estimates the effects of possible offer and financial bidders on bid 
premiums using full sample. The dependent variable is the first premiums in Panel A and is the final 
premiums in Panel B. Model 1 of Panel A (Panel B) presents the estimating results of the effects of possible 
offer and financial bidder on the first (final) premiums. Model 2 of Panel A (Panel B) presents the DiD 
regression results of the incremental effect of financial bidders on the association of possible offer and first 
(final) premiums based on the matched sample using PSM method. All variables are defined in Appendix. 
Industry and year fixed-effect are controlled. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, c 
indicate the significance of coefficients and F statistics at the one, five  and ten percent level respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Panel A First Premiums  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
POSSIBLE_OFFER  0.1895
c  0.1005  0.0716  0.1045 
FIN_BIDDER  -0.0207  0.1032  -0.7524
a  0.2356 
POSSIBLE_OFFER* 
FIN_BIDDER 
     0.6810
a  0.2615 
POST_REFORM  0.2214  0.1377  0.5406
b  0.2610 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0128  0.0322  -0.0964
a  0.0362 
LEVERAGE  0.0330  0.2491  0.3090  0.3550 
Q_RATIO  -0.0269  0.0379  -0.0589  0.0500 
TOEHOLD  -0.0102
c  0.0061  -0.0294
a  0.0091 
DOMESTIC  0.2037
b  0.0948  0.2530
b  0.1001 
SHARE_DEAL  -0.2714
c  0.1524  -0.4621
a  0.1757 
PRIV_PUB  -0.2705
c  0.1445  -0.2905
c  0.1687 
HOSTILE  -0.3860  0.3657  -1.1839
a  0.3771 
CONSTANT  -0.1772  0.3909  0.4814  0.4272 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  1.50b    3.19a   
P-value of F-statistics  0.050    0.000   
R2  0.08    0.26   
No. of Obs.  641    592   
  Model 1  Model 2 
Panel B Final Premiums  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
POSSIBLE_OFFER  0.1951
b  0.0989  0.1320  0.1041 
FIN_BIDDER  0.0252  0.0996  -0.5249
b  0.2141 
POSSIBLE_OFFER* 
FIN_BIDDER 
     0.5035
b  0.2410 
POST_REFORM  0.2049  0.1356  0.5287
b  0.2487 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  0.0095  0.0307  -0.0686
c  0.0352 
LEVERAGE  -0.0102  0.2498  0.2236  0.3516 
Q_RATIO  -0.0334  0.0383  -0.0740  0.0536 
TOEHOLD  -0.0116
c  0.0061  -0.0312




Table 7 (Cont’d) 
DOMESTIC  0.2047
b  0.0926  0.2350
b  0.0967 
SHARE_DEAL  -0.2479
c  0.1502  -0.4424
b  0.1783 
PRIV_PUB  -0.2669
c  0.1427  -0.2892
c  0.1656 
HOSTILE  -0.1614  0.3291  -1.0531
a  0.3709 
CONSTANT  -0.2363  0.3845  0.5993  0.4143 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  1.52b    2.88a   
P-value of F-statistics  0.047    0.000   
R2  0.074    0.252   



























Table 8 The effects of possible-offer announcement in the pre-reform and post-reform periods 
This table presents the regression estimates for the effect of announcing possible offer on deal announcement returns and premiums of takeovers undertaken 
before and after the year of the reform. From Model 1 to 3, the dependent variables are 3-day CARs around the deal announcement, first bid premiums, and final 
bid premiums, respectively. Panel A presents the estimation results in the pre-reform period. Panel B presents the estimation results in the post-reform period. 
All variables are defined in Appendix. Industry and year fixed-effect are controlled. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, c indicate the 
significance of coefficients and F statistics at the one, five  and ten percent level respectively. 
Panel A  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Pre-reform  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
POSSIBLE_OFFER  -0.0378  0.0235  0.2671
b  0.1343  0.2852
b  0.1351 
FIN_BIDDER  -0.0149  0.0349  -0.0713  0.1345  -0.0768  0.1340 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0077  0.0062  0.0115  0.0481  0.0486  0.0494 
LEVERAGE  -0.0505  0.0724  0.1007  0.2938  0.0507  0.2945 
ROA  0.0116  0.0625         
Q_RATIO  -0.0191
b  0.0086  -0.0550  0.0578  -0.0605  0.0590 
HHI  -0.1129
c  0.0646         
TOEHOLD  -0.0016
c  0.0010  -0.0114  0.0087  -0.0124  0.0086 
CASH_DEAL  0.1283
a  0.0278         
SHARE_DEAL  0.0158  0.0330  -0.3220  0.1998  -0.2529  0.1903 
PUB_PUB  -0.0682
c  0.0388         
PRIV_PUB  -0.1028
a  0.0357  -0.4304
b  0.1931  -0.3521
c  0.1971 
DOMESTIC  -0.0305  0.0272  0.2048  0.1252  0.2020  0.1238 
HOSTILE  -0.0321  0.0504  -0.7261  0.5070  -0.4083  0.4403 
IND_MATCH  -0.0224  0.0307         
AUCTION          -0.3290
c  0.1909 
CONSTANT  0.3760
a  0.1020  -0.0323  0.5418  -0.2170  0.5465 




Table 8 (Cont’d) 
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  4.06
a    1.44
c    1.48
c   
P-value of F-statistics  0.00    0.09    0.07   
R2  0.1635    0.0953    0.1014   
No. of Obs.  568    425    425   
Panel B  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Post-reform  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
POSSIBLE_OFFER  -0.0622
c  0.0359  -0.0219  0.1832  -0.0487  0.1793 
FIN_BIDDER  -0.0547  0.0682  0.0881  0.1750  0.2472
c  0.1437 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0168  0.0119  -0.0135  0.0381  0.0077  0.0367 
LEVERAGE  -0.0132  0.1031  -0.1939  0.3804  -0.0980  0.3700 
ROA  0.1217  0.1076         
Q_RATIO  0.0128  0.0143  0.0489  0.0424  0.0343  0.0418 
HHI  0.0958  0.0853         
TOEHOLD  -0.0024
c  0.0013  -0.0107  0.0079  -0.0136
c  0.0077 
CASH_DEAL  0.1584
a  0.0422         
SHARE_DEAL  -0.0811
c  0.0456  -0.2199  0.2723  -0.3113  0.2786 
PUB_PUB  0.0076  0.0544         
PRIV_PUB  -0.0044  0.0542  0.0775  0.1508  0.0011  0.1389 
DOMESTIC  -0.0164  0.0324  0.1701  0.1556  0.1115  0.1304 
HOSTILE  0.1927  0.1200  0.3288
b  0.1668  0.3581
c  0.1847 
IND_MATCH  -0.0053  0.0428         
AUCTION          -0.2162  0.3709 
CONSTANT  0.2882








Industry fixed-effect  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  4.27
a    0.94    0.98   
P-value of F-statistics  0.00    0.5446    0.4856   
R2  0.2371    0.1302    0.1393   
No. of Obs.  263    216    216   
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Table 9 The effect of aggregative economic conditions  
This table presents the estimates for effect of aggregative economic conditions on the relationship between 
financial bidders and deal bid premiums. The dependent variables are first (in Model 1) and final (in Model 
2) bid premiums. All variables are defined in Appendix. Industry and year fixed-effect are controlled. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, c indicate the significance of coefficients and F 





  Model 1  Model 2 









 0.1003  0.1954
b 
 0.0988 
FIN_BIDDER  0.3506  0.3650  0.3461  0.3593 
CREDIT_SPREAD  24.5626
b 
 11.3966  13.7929  8.9665 
FIN_BIDDER*CREDIT_SPREAD  -0.5827  0.5644  -0.5038  0.5489 
LN(TARGET_SIZE)  -0.0132  0.0321  0.0092  0.0307 
LEVERAGE  0.0372  0.2485  -0.0066  0.2494 
ROA         
Q_RATIO  -0.0265  0.0383  -0.0330  0.0386 
HHI         
TOEHOLD  -0.0104
c 
 0.0061  -0.0118
c 
 0.0061 
CASH_DEAL         
SHARE_DEAL  -0.2612
c 
 0.1530  -0.2391  0.1500 
PUB_PUB         
PRIV_PUB  -0.2790
c 





 0.0946  0.2073
b 
 0.0923 
HOSTILE  -0.3830  0.3670  -0.1589  0.3291 
IND_MATCH         
POST_REFORM  -5.8518
b 
 2.8209  -3.1862  2.2172 
CONSTANT  -12.8240
b 
 5.9016  -7.3507  4.6526 
Industry fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
Year fixed-effect  Yes    Yes   
F-statistics  1.45
c
    1.46
c
   
P-value of F-statistics  0.06    0.06   
R2  0.0778    0.0746   
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